Reduced specificity of autobiographical memory and depression: The role of executive control by Dalgleish, T. et al.
Reduced Specificity of Autobiographical Memory and Depression:
The Role of Executive Control
Tim Dalgleish
Medical Research Council Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit
J. Mark G. Williams
University of Oxford
Ann-Marie J. Golden
Medical Research Council Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit
Nicola Perkins
University of Bath
Lisa Feldman Barrett
Boston College
Phillip J. Barnard
Medical Research Council Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit
Cecilia Au Yeung and Victoria Murphy
University of Bath
Rachael Elward
University of Cardiff
Kate Tchanturia
Institute of Psychiatry, University of London
Edward Watkins
University of Exeter
It has been widely established that depressed mood states and clinical depression, as well as a range of
other psychiatric disorders, are associated with a relative difficulty in accessing specific autobiographical
information in response to emotion-related cue words on an Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT;
J. M. G. Williams & K. Broadbent, 1986). In 8 studies the authors examined the extent to which this
relationship is a function of impaired executive control associated with these mood states and clinical
disorders. Studies 1–4 demonstrated that performance on the AMT is associated with performance on
measures of executive control, independent of depressed mood. Furthermore, Study 1 showed that
executive control (as measured by verbal fluency) mediated the relationship between both depressed
mood and a clinical diagnosis of eating disorder and AMT performance. Using a stratified sample in
Study 5, the authors confirmed the positive association between depressed mood and impaired perfor-
mance on the AMT. Studies 6–8 involved experimental manipulations of the parameters of the AMT
designed to further indicate that reduced executive control is to a significant extent driving the
relationship between depressed mood and AMT performance. The potential role of executive control in
accounting for other aspects of the AMT literature is discussed.
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When asked to recall specific autobiographical memories of
events with a duration of less than 1 day in response to word cues,
people sometimes produce overly general responses. For example,
the cue “vacation” might prompt the generic recollection “I en-
joyed all of my vacations as a child” instead of the required
specific response “I remember the day that we went to Disneyland
last year.” Williams and Broadbent (1986) serendipitously discov-
ered that this difficulty in producing specific memories was more
widespread in their group of depressed parasuicide patients than in
a matched control sample. Since this initial study, reduced auto-
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biographical memory specificity (AMS) has been found to be a
characteristic of performance on this particular task (the Autobio-
graphical Memory Test [AMT]; Williams & Broadbent, 1986) in
a number of clinical groups. These include individuals suffering
from clinical depression (e.g., Brewin, Reynolds, & Tata, 1999;
Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993; Kuyken & Dal-
gleish, 1995; Wessel, Meeren, Peeters, Arntz, & Merckelbach,
2001), posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; e.g., McNally, Litz,
Prassas, Shin, & Weathers, 1994), acute stress disorder (e.g.,
Harvey, Bryant, & Dang, 1998), eating disorders (e.g., Dalgleish et
al., 2003), and borderline personality disorder (e.g., Startup et al.,
2001). Furthermore, reduced AMS has been found to be associated
with levels of subclinical depressed mood in both naturalistic (e.g.,
Ramponi, Barnard, & Nimmo-Smith, 2004) and mood-induction
studies (e.g., Au Yeung, Dalgleish, Golden, & Schartau, 2006).
A number of key findings have suggested that reduced AMS is
more than simply a cognitive curiosity. Instead, the data indicate
that reduced AMS indexes one or more fundamental cognitive
processes closely linked to the onset, maintenance, and recovery
from a variety of clinical and subclinical states.
The first such key finding was initially reported by Brittlebank
et al. (1993), who showed that reduced AMS predicted later
clinical recovery in individuals with major depressive disorder,
over and above initial levels of depressive symptoms. This longi-
tudinal effect has been replicated in other depressed samples (e.g.,
Dalgleish, Spinks, Yiend, & Kuyken, 2001; Hipwell, Reynolds, &
Pitts Crick, 2004; Mackinger, Loschin, & Leibetseder, 2000; but
see Brewin et al., 1999). Similarly, Harvey et al. (1998) found that
reduced AMS posttrauma in motor vehicle accident survivors
predicted higher later levels of posttraumatic distress (but see
Kangas, Henry, & Bryant, 2005).
The second key finding is that participants in Brittlebank et al.’s
(1993) study who recovered from depression still showed reduced
AMS relative to control participants, indicating that reduced AMS
is a stable marker in recovered or remitted clinical groups and not
just a function of acute depressive symptomatology. This was
demonstrated more systematically by Mackinger, Pachinger, Lei-
betseder, and Fartacek (2000), who compared never-depressed and
recovered-depressed women on the AMT and found relatively
reduced AMS in the recovered sample.
Finally, reduced AMS has been shown to relate to impoverished
problem-solving ability, with participants low in specificity find-
ing it difficult to generate solutions on social problem-solving
tasks (e.g., Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 1996). This fact, along
with the related finding that reduced AMS is associated with a
difficulty in generating specific simulations of the future (Wil-
liams, Ellis, Tyers, MacLeod, & Rose, 1996), suggests that re-
duced AMS is of potential clinical significance when considering
impairments in day-to-day cognitive functioning in some patient
groups.
Taken together these key findings suggest that a better under-
standing of the psychological processes involved in reducing AMS
will yield insight into cognitive factors implicated in the onset and
maintenance of depressed mood, clinical depression, and other
psychopathological states as well as day-to-day cognitive impair-
ments associated with a range of clinical disorders.
Theoretical attempts to understand the source of reduced AMS
in the affective science and abnormal psychology literature have
been strongly influenced by another aspect of the AMS data—the
relationship between reduced AMS and a history of trauma. The
prototypical study in this area was by Kuyken and Brewin (1995),
who examined AMT performance in depressed women with and
without a reported history of childhood abuse. Women with a
history of abuse showed reduced AMS relative to those women
who had not been abused. Furthermore, increased levels of current
intrusion and avoidance symptoms concerning the abuse correlated
positively with the reduction in AMS. Since this initial study, this
relationship between reduced AMS and both a history of trauma
and greater intrusive and avoidant symptomatology following
trauma has been replicated several times and for various kinds of
traumatic experience (e.g., Dalgleish et al., 2003; de Decker,
Hermans, Raes, & Eelen, 2003; Henderson, Hargreaves, Gregory,
& Williams, 2002; though see Kuyken, Howell, & Dalgleish,
2006).
Building on these findings, the most consensual theoretical
explanation of reduced AMS to date has been the affect regulation
hypothesis (Williams, Stiles, & Shapiro, 1999). The affect regu-
lation hypothesis accounts for reduced AMS in terms of difficul-
ties in searching a self-memory system (M. A. Conway &
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). The proposal is that to recall a specific
autobiographical memory to a cue word, one’s first step is to
generate a restricted set of categorical descriptors constrained by
the cue word. These descriptors are then used to search the
memory system for memories that relate to that cue word. Subse-
quent sets of descriptors are then generated iteratively, allowing an
increasingly refined search of this categorical subset of memories
in order to retrieve specific episodes that comply with the task
instructions. Williams, Stiles, and Shapiro (1999) proposed that to
progress beyond the categorical descriptor stage during memory
search to a more refined interrogation of the specific memory
database, one must inhibit unneeded categorical descriptors in
some way.1 Failure to inhibit these descriptors, it is proposed, will
lead to the generation of overly general responses (reduced AMS)
to cue words.
Williams has further suggested that children learn to inhibit
irrelevant descriptors during memory search as a function of
normal development but that trauma in childhood impairs this
learning (Williams et al., in press). The heart of the affect regula-
tion hypothesis is that painful emotional information is avoided by
1 The label inhibition is used here and throughout the rest of the article
as a term of convenience. Within cognitive psychology a distinction has
been drawn between concepts of strong and weak inhibition (e.g., Dal-
gleish, Mathews, & Wood, 1999). Strong inhibition refers to putative
situations in which processes or representations are directly inhibited
within the cognitive system. The notion of strong inhibition is somewhat
controversial, with many arguing that there is no need for such a construct
at the functional level of explanation (see MacLeod, Dodd, Sheard, Wilson,
& Bibi, 2003, for a provocative discussion). In contrast, weak inhibition
refers to situations in which a given process or representation is less
activated than competing representations, as if it has been inhibited. How-
ever, weak inhibition can potentially arise entirely as a function of the
competing representations or processes being selectively activated; in other
words, weak inhibition does not require that strong inhibition is taking
place, though of course it does not preclude it either. For the present
purposes, the term inhibition is used in this weak sense, whereby it is as yet
unclear whether strong inhibitory mechanisms are at work (cf. Dagenbach
& Carr, 1994).
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aborting memory search processes at a nonspecific level of anal-
ysis. Consequently, the argument goes, individuals with a history
of childhood trauma will be less able to inhibit categorical descrip-
tors during memory search and will therefore produce relatively
reduced AMS on the AMT. As childhood trauma is a key correlate
of depression and other clinical states (e.g., Boudewyn & Liem,
1995), the affect regulation hypothesis provides a plausible ac-
count of reduced AMS in a range of clinical conditions.
Although the affect regulation hypothesis has clear face validity
as an account of reduced AMS, it seems unlikely to be a complete
account. For example, it is difficult to see how the affect regulation
hypothesis can offer a plausible conceptualization of reduced AMS
following a negative mood induction in healthy individuals with
no history of depression (Au Yeung et al., 2006) or in healthy
individuals following category generation on related themes (Bar-
nard, Watkins, & Ramponi, 2006). An additional or possibly
alternative explanation for reduced AMS, and one that has the
benefit of parsimony in that it is consistent with the wider theo-
retical literature on depression (and indeed other forms of emo-
tional disorder), is that the phenomenon results from relatively
poor executive or attentional control on the part of depressed
individuals in the face of a cognitively demanding task—in this
case the AMT.
Although there is limited consensus about exactly which cog-
nitive operations fall under the rubric of executive control, let
alone about which processes might underpin executive control
within a psychological system (see Miyake & Shah, 1999, Ques-
tion 2), it is generally agreed that executive control broadly en-
capsulates the set of cognitive processes that are responsible for
the planning, initiation, sequencing, and monitoring of complex
goal-directed behavior in the face of distracting information. Rel-
atively impaired executive control in depression is a key empirical
finding in the literature (see Burt, Zembar, & Niederehe, 1995;
Hartlage, Alloy, Vazquez, & Dykman, 1993, for reviews) and a
prominent feature of a number of influential theoretical models of
the disorder (Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004; Ellis & Ashbrook,
1988; Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Hertel & Rude, 1991).2
A prototypical model of impaired executive control in depres-
sion has been articulated by Hertel and colleagues (e.g., Hertel &
Hardin, 1990; Hertel & Rude, 1991; see Hertel, 2000, for an
overview) in their cognitive-initiative account. The central thesis
of the cognitive-initiative approach is that where executive control
processes are poorly constrained by a given task (for example the
AMT), depressed individuals should exhibit impaired performance
due to a deficit in the ability to initiate relevant strategies or
generate appropriate hypotheses when performing the task. Within
this type of executive control framework, reduced AMS on the
AMT may be a consequence of impoverished retrieval strategies
during memory search in certain individuals or groups, a difficulty
in maintaining or applying the task instructions to be specific
during the task itself, and/or problems with inhibiting inappropri-
ate (i.e., overgeneral) candidate memory responses on the task.
It is interesting to note that in the same essay in which Williams
(1996) proposed the affect regulation hypothesis he also high-
lighted a putative role for executive processes in defining the
reduced AMS effect. It was assumed that once memory search had
been aborted, further iterations of the retrieval process would give
rise to the activation of other intermediate descriptions. After a
number of such iterations a more highly elaborated network of
categoric memories would exist so that, under conditions in which
executive control was compromised, such information would be
more likely to be generated as responses on future memory
searches (Williams, 1996).
Despite these predictions, a clear empirical link between re-
duced AMS and executive control has yet to be established. The
results from the handful of studies relevant to this issue have
generally been negative, mixed, or inconclusive. For example,
Williams and Broadbent (1986) found that reduced AMS was not
associated with category fluency (for vegetables or boys’ names)
or processing speed (the time taken to judge a series of 50 “silly
sentences” as true or false; Baddeley, Emslie, & Nimmo-Smith,
1992). Other studies found a negative association between perfor-
mance in a word fluency task and reduced AMS (e.g., Williams &
Dritschel, 1992). Still others indicated some role for general cog-
nitive ability (including executive control processes) in AMT
performance but have suggested that such processes offer a far-
from-complete explanation of the reduced AMS effect. For exam-
ple, Park, Goodyer, and Teasdale (2002) matched two samples of
adolescents for IQ but still found that individuals in the depressed
group gave significantly fewer specific responses. Similarly, Wes-
sel et al. (2001) found that educational level contributed signifi-
cantly to the prediction of AMS but that between-group differ-
ences remained after controlling for this variable.
One reason for the equivocal nature of the findings to date may
be that the research seeking to account for the reduced AMS effect
has not focused clearly enough or exclusively on tasks that load
heavily on executive control. In fact, depression (and indeed other
forms of psychopathology) does not seem to be associated with
impairments on all forms of cognitive task but rather seems to
relate specifically to tasks in which effective executive control is
particularly important (e.g., Hartlage et al., 1993). The rationale
for the present series of studies was therefore to investigate sys-
tematically for the first time the extent to which reduced AMS on
the AMT is an example of poor task performance on a paradigm
that loads significantly on executive control and that is associated
with depressed mood and/or various clinical states.
To this end, in the first study we sought to examine, through
reanalysis of existing data in patients with eating disorders, the
relationship between AMT performance and verbal fluency—a
classic executive control measure (Rosen & Engle, 1997). We also
included a mediational analysis in Study 1 in order to investigate
whether the relationship between both an eating disorder diagnosis
and depressed mood, on the one hand, and reduced AMS, on the
other, was significantly accounted for by verbal fluency scores.
The aim behind Studies 2–4 was to further establish a nomo-
logical net (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955) for the AMT by demon-
strating a clear relationship (independent of depression) between
AMT performance and performance on other nonautobiographical
and generally emotion-unrelated tasks that themselves depend on
executive control processes. In these three studies we therefore
exploited naturally occurring individual differences in executive
control capabilities in unselected samples to establish the existence
2 Not all of these theoretical models talk explicitly about executive
control. For example, Ellis’s resource allocation model (e.g., Ellis &
Ashbrook, 1988) uses a spatial metaphor whereby impaired task perfor-
mance in depression is a function of a reduction in executive “resources.”
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of such a relationship, and in each case depressed mood was
included as a covariate in the key analyses.
Having established that the AMT is a task associated with other
executive control measures independent of depression (Studies
1–4) and that executive control mediates the relationship between
depression (as well as eating disorder diagnosis) and reduced AMS
in a clinical sample, in Studies 5–8 we sought to further show that
the diminished executive control routinely associated with de-
pressed mood (e.g., Hartlage et al., 1993) is an important factor in
determining the patterns of AMT performance in depression. To
do this we first replicated the significant association between
depressed mood and AMT performance in a stratified dysphoric
sample, using the standard version of the AMT from the extant
literature (Study 5). We then manipulated the task parameters of
this standard AMT in ways that would interact with individual
differences in executive control (such as those that occur naturally
in correspondence with individual differences in levels of de-
pressed mood; Studies 6–8). In these latter four studies, levels of
depressed mood were not included as a covariate, because the
nature and direction of the relationship between depression and
AMS, in the face of variations of the AMT parameters, were the
key variables of interest.
Study 1: AMS and Verbal Fluency in Patients With an
Eating Disorder and Matched Control Participants—A
Reanalysis of Existing Data
In a previous study, Dalgleish et al. (2003) described how
patients with a diagnosis of an eating disorder exhibited reduced
AMS on the AMT relative to healthy control participants. Further-
more, these results indicated that reduced AMS, indexed by num-
bers of overgeneral memories, was associated with level of self-
reported parental abuse (mirroring earlier data; e.g., Kuyken &
Brewin, 1995). A proportion of the participants in Dalgleish et al.’s
(2003) study also took part in a separate study (Godley, Tchantu-
ria, MacLeod, & Schmidt, 2001) in which participants had to
complete a standard verbal fluency test—generating as many
words beginning with the letter s as they could in 1 min. Verbal
fluency is regarded as a broad measure of executive control (e.g.,
Rosen & Engle, 1997). This allowed us in this reanalysis of the
data to examine the degree to which verbal fluency was associated
with reduced AMS on the AMT. We also wanted to examine
whether substituting participants’ verbal fluency scores in place of
their AMS scores in the analyses previously reported (Dalgleish et
al., 2003) generated a similar pattern of findings. Participants in
Godley et al.’s (2001) study completed a test in which they
generated as many specific putative future autobiographical expe-
riences as they could in relation to different future time domains
(the Future Fluency Test). This allowed us to examine whether
reduced AMS in our healthy control participants was related to a
reduced ability to generate specific events about the future on the
Future Fluency Test (similar to that found by Williams et al., 1996;
see the present article’s introduction), again with a view to exam-
ining subsequently whether this relationship would be the same if
we substituted AMS scores with verbal fluency scores in the same
control participants. For all of these planned analyses, we covaried
scores on a measure of depression to ensure that any relationships
that emerged were not simply due to both variables being proxy
depression measures.
Finally, we examined whether verbal fluency scores mediated
the relationships between depression or eating disorder diagnosis
(as the predictors) and AMS (as the criterion), to establish whether
the relationship between depression or eating disorder and AMS
could be significantly accounted for by variations in executive
control.
Our specific hypotheses for Study 1 were therefore as follows:
Hypothesis 1: There will be a significant positive correlation
between AMS and verbal fluency across all participants, with
self-reported depression levels partialed out.
Hypothesis 2: Participants in the eating disorder group should
score lower on the verbal fluency test compared with control
participants.
Hypothesis 3: Verbal fluency performance in the eating dis-
order group should correlate negatively with degree of self-
reported parental abuse, with levels of self-reported depres-
sion partialed out.
Hypothesis 4: AMS should be significantly positively corre-
lated with numbers of specific events generated on the Future
Fluency Test in the healthy control participants.
Hypothesis 5: This relationship should be mirrored by that
between verbal fluency and performance on the Future Flu-
ency Test.
Hypothesis 6: Verbal fluency will significantly mediate the
relationships between depression and AMS and between eat-
ing disorder diagnosis and AMS.
Method
Participants
The clinical participants were 32 patients with a primary diagnosis of
eating disorder.3 Twenty were diagnosed with anorexia nervosa (restricting
subtype, n 15; binge–purge subtype, n 5), and 12 were diagnosed with
bulimia nervosa according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (4th ed.; DSM–IV; American Psychiatric Association,
1994) criteria.
The healthy control group was composed of 19 participants recruited
through an established participant pool at the Institute of Psychiatry,
London. Control participants had no self-reported history of psychiatric or
eating problems and were comparable with the clinical participants on age,
education level, and gender ratio (see the Results and Discussion section).
Further details about all participants and their selection and diagnosis can
be found in Dalgleish et al.’s (2003) article.
Materials and Measures
The AMT. The AMT was exactly as described by Kuyken and Dal-
gleish (1995). Ten emotional words (from Williams & Broadbent, 1986)
were used to cue the memories: five pleasant (happy, safe, interested,
successful, and surprised) and five unpleasant (sorry, angry, clumsy, hurt,
and lonely). Participants were given 1 min in each case to retrieve a specific
3 This sample size is lower than that reported in Dalgleish et al.’s (2003)
study because a number of the eating disordered patients did not complete
the verbal fluency task.
26 DALGLEISH ET AL.
autobiographical memory—a specific time and place when something
happened to them. Participants were told that the memory they recalled
could be something that happened recently or a long time ago and that it
could be an important or trivial event but that the memory should be of
something that happened at a particular time on a particular day. Examples
of acceptable and unacceptable responses were given. A printed version of
the recall instructions was given to the participants to read. Cue words were
presented on 12.5 cm  7.5 cm laminated cards and were written in black
ink in capital letters 3.5 cm high. Words were presented in a separate
random order for each participant. To ensure that participants understood
the instructions, we gave two practice cues (relieved and tired).
Generated memories were tape-recorded and transcribed for coding
according to the criteria laid down by Williams (1992). Specific memories
were defined as events that happened in a particular instance or lasted for
1 day or less. Nonspecific memories included extended memories (events
that lasted for longer periods of time) and categoric memories (events that
occurred repeatedly over a period of time). If the participants failed to
recall a memory within the time limit or talked about things that were not
memories (e.g., an opinion that is associated with the cue), their responses
were classed as “no memories.” If the type of memory that the participants
recalled was unclear, or if participants retrieved the same memory to more
than one cue or offered responses that related to future events, they were
prompted with the words “What is the memory that you are thinking of
there?”’ or “Can you tell me a bit more about that memory?” For the
studies reported in this article, all analyses focus on numbers of specific
memories; in other words, AMS scores refer to number of specific mem-
ories generated to the entire set of words. Interrater agreement between
Ann-Marie J. Golden and Tim Dalgleish on 50% of the retrieved memories
for Study 1 (n 305) indicated good reliability (  .78) comparable with
previous studies. The same raters were used for all subsequent studies.
Thurstone Verbal Fluency Test. A standard version of the verbal
fluency test from Lezak (1995) was used. Participants were asked to list as
many words as they could in 1 min beginning with the letter s. Participants
were informed that repetitions, proper nouns (e.g., Switzerland), and more
than one word of the same origin (e.g., swim, swimming) were not accept-
able answers, and they were given examples of each. The total number of
acceptable words produced was the verbal fluency score.
Early experience. Perception of early family experience was assessed
using the Measure of Parenting Style (Parker et al., 1997). This is a 15-item
self-report measure with scales assessing parental overcontrol, indiffer-
ence, and abuse. The Abuse subscale is the focus of the present analyses.
For more details see Dalgleish et al.’s (2003) study.
Future Fluency Test. This was as described in Godley et al.’s (2001)
study. Participants were asked to generate as many specific future events as
they could for three different time periods—the next week, including the
current day; the next year; and the next 5–10 years. Participants were asked
to generate positive and negative events separately. There was a time limit
of 1 min for each period–valence combination. For the purposes of the
present study a composite score of the total number of events generated
across the six conditions was used.
Procedure
In this study and in all of the studies reported here, participants were
tested individually and face-to-face in a quiet testing environment, and all
testing was carried out by the same experimenter. Participants also com-
pleted the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond &
Snaith, 1983), a self-report measure of experienced anxiety and depression,
immediately prior to the AMT.
Results and Discussion
Descriptive statistics for the key variables across the two
groups—eating disordered participants and control participants—
are presented in Table 1. For the present study and all subsequent
studies in this article, analyses examining a priori hypotheses are
one-tailed. All other analyses are two-tailed. Where data do not
meet the criteria for parametric statistics this is noted in the text
and suitable transformations and/or nonparametric methods are
applied.
Our first hypothesis of a significant relationship between AMS
and verbal fluency across the whole sample, after partialing out
self-reported depression on the HADS—which correlated signifi-
cantly with AMS, r(49)  .35, p  .05—was supported with
poorer verbal fluency associated with reduced AMS, pr(48) .47,
p  .01. Furthermore, in a regression analysis with both HADS–
Depression scores and verbal fluency as predictors (accounting for
28% of the variance in AMS), only verbal fluency accounted for
significant unique variance (18%), t(48)  3.55, p  .001, versus
4% for HADS–Depression scores.
The critical analyses involving AMS were then repeated using
verbal fluency scores in place of AMS scores to examine Hypoth-
eses 2 and 3. The results indicated that verbal fluency scores, as
predicted, differed significantly across groups, t(49)  2.96, p 
.01, with eating disordered participants showing poorer fluency.
Table 1
Data for the Demographic, Memory, Future Fluency, Verbal Fluency, Self-Reported Abuse, and
Mood Variables in Study 1
Variable
EDa Control participantsb
M SD M SD
Age (years) 26.78 8.10 27.73 5.96
HADS–Depression 11.38 4.99 2.00 1.89
Verbal fluency 16.47 4.06 20.32 5.15
MOPS–Abusec 6.96 5.87 2.05 2.75
No. specific memories on the AMT 6.03 2.43 8.63 1.38
Future Fluency Testd 24.43 9.99 27.00 6.23
Note. ED  eating disordered participants; HADS–Depression  Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale—
Depression subscale score; MOPS–AbuseMeasure of Parenting Style—Abuse subscale score, summed across
mother and father; AMT  Autobiographical Memory Test.
a n  32 (3 men, 29 women). b n  19 (1 man, 18 women). c Four of the ED group did not complete this
measure. d Two of the ED group and 1 control participant did not complete this measure.
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However, in the eating disorder group, the correlation between
fluency scores and Measure of Parenting Style—Abuse subscale
scores did not approach significance, pr(30)  .02, ns, thus pro-
viding no support for Hypothesis 3.
The relationship between AMS and the number of future events
generated in the healthy participants on the Future Fluency Test
(Hypothesis 4) was significant and positive, r(16)  .66, p  .01,
and remained once depression—which correlated with Future Flu-
ency Scores, r(16)  .49, p  .05—was partialed out, pr(15) 
.57, p  .01, consistent with the findings reported by Williams et
al. (1996) for the specificity of future imagined events.
We next established that in the healthy participants, verbal
fluency scores were significantly positively correlated with the
total number of emotional future events generated on the Future
Fluency Test, r(16)  .46, p  .03. This remained significant
when self-reported depression was partialed out, pr(15) .44, p
.05, in line with Hypothesis 5.
Finally, we conducted two sets of mediational analyses to ex-
amine, first, whether the relationship between diagnostic status
(eating disorder vs. control participants) and AMS was mediated
by verbal fluency scores and, second, whether the relationship
between depressed mood (on the HADS–Depression subscale)
across all participants and AMS was mediated by verbal fluency
scores. These analyses were conducted using the bootstrapping
procedures recommended for smaller samples (MacKinnon, Lock-
wood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002; Preacher & Hayes, 2004)
and operationalized in an SPSS macro by Preacher and Hayes
(2004). In our analyses we used 5,000 bootstrap resamples of the
data with replacement. Statistical significance with alpha at .05 is
indicated by the 95% confidence intervals not crossing zero. The
results revealed a significant mediation effect of verbal fluency
with respect to the relationship between eating disorder diagnosis
and AMS, Sobel statistic  .75, SE  .36, 95% confidence
intervals  0.15, 1.56, and between HADS–Depression and AMS,
Sobel statistic  .05, SE  .03, 95% confidence intervals 
.12, .002.
Taken together, these data provide evidence for significant
shared variance between AMS performance and a standardized
measure of executive control (verbal fluency; Rosen & Engle,
1997) that, on face value, has little or nothing to do with autobi-
ography or emotion. Crucially, this significant shared variance is
independent of depression. It is interesting to note that the data also
indicate that the relationship between AMS and self-reported
abuse in the clinical group was somewhat independent of execu-
tive control, at least as indexed by verbal fluency scores. This issue
is revisited in the General Discussion. Finally, the mediational
analyses suggest that significant aspects of the relationships be-
tween both eating disorder diagnosis and depressed mood, on the
one hand, and AMS, on the other, can be accounted for by
variations in executive control.
Study 2: The Relationship Between AMS and Scores on a
Range of Tests of Executive Control
In Study 2 we again explored the relationship between AMS and
executive control, independent of self-reported depression: this
time in an unselected sample of participants. We used a wide range
of tasks that are accepted as measures of executive control in the
neuropsychological literature in order to permit a broad examina-
tion of our hypothesis that a significant amount of the variance in
AMS would be accounted for by executive control measures that
have little or nothing explicitly to do with autobiography or
emotion.
Method
Participants
To determine sample size, we conducted a power analysis based on the
large correlation (Cohen, 1988) between verbal fluency and AMS from
Study 1. To obtain 80% power with an alpha of .05 that a similar-sized
correlation would be different from zero in a given direction in the present
study, a sample size of 24 was indicated (Cohen, 1988). This was used as
a guide for the present study and subsequent studies unless otherwise
indicated. On this basis, 24 unselected participants (5 men, 19 women)
were recruited from the Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit (CBU) volun-
teer panel.4 The mean age of participants was 40.83 years (SD  9.18
years).
Materials and Measures
The AMT. The AMT was as for Study 1, with the exception that a
greater number of cue words were used, to provide a wider range of scores
to facilitate correlational analyses. In this study, 12 positive and 12 nega-
tive cue words were selected (Brittlebank et al., 1993), balanced for ratings
of emotion-relatedness (Brittlebank et al., 1993) and frequency (Kuc˘era &
Francis, 1967). Participants practiced with three neutral words (gigantic,
grass, and absence).
Thurstone Verbal Fluency Test. The version of this test from Study 1
was used (Lezak, 1995).
Design Fluency Test. A nonverbal equivalent of the verbal fluency
test, the design fluency test (Jones-Gotman & Milner, 1977), was used to
assess divergent thinking. Participants were asked to “invent” as many
drawings—which could not represent actual objects or shapes—in 1 min.
Participants were told to avoid simply drawing scribbles, spending too long
on any one drawing, or inventing two similar looking drawings. Practice
was given in which participants invented three drawings and were given
feedback with reference to the instructions of the task. The total number of
drawings, the number of errors (i.e., highly similar looking drawings,
drawings of actual objects, etc.), and the corrected score were recorded.
Alternate Uses Test. A short version of this test as described by Lezak
(1995) was used as a further measure of divergent thinking. Participants
were asked to generate as many creative uses for a brick as they could in
1 min. Participants were instructed to avoid uses that were typical (e.g.,
building a wall) or nonsensical (e.g., wearing as a hat). Examples of
unacceptable answers were provided. The total number of appropriate uses
and the number of errors (i.e., typical or nonsensical uses) were recorded.
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale—III (WAIS–III; Wechsler, 1998)
Block Design. Participants were administered the Block Design subtest as
set out by the WAIS–III manual (Wechsler, 1998). Participants had to
arrange a number of blocks with sides of different colors in a configuration
that matched either the experimenter’s blocks or a printed design. There
was a time limit on each design. A total raw score was converted to an
age-related scaled score (Wechsler, 1998) for each participant.
Porteus Maze Test. The Vineland Revision set of Porteus Maze Tests
was administered (Porteus, 1965) as a measure of planning. Tests Year VII
to Adult I were used. Participants were presented with a series of mazes
and were asked to draw a line, from the beginning point, out of the maze.
Participants were asked to complete each maze as quickly as possible,
4 For those studies that used the CBU volunteer panel, we took care that
no participant was involved in more than one study.
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without touching or crossing lines, entering parts of the maze blocked at
one end, tracing over the maze, or lifting the pen off the paper, until the
maze had been completed. Examples of each of these violations were
provided by the experimenter on a separate maze. A qualitative (Q) score
was calculated in line with Porteus’s (1965) procedure. The Q score
reflected the number of violations made by each participant, with higher Q
scores equating to more violations.
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, &
Erbaugh, 1961). The BDI is a 21-item inventory presented in multiple-
choice format that measures presence and degree of depression. Each item
corresponds to a specific category of depressive symptom and/or attitude
and consists of a graded series of four self-evaluative statements that are
rank ordered and weighted to reflect the range of severity of the symptom
from neutral to maximum severity (0–3). The psychometric properties of
the BDI are good (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988). The BDI was used for all
subsequent studies (3–8) as the measure of depressed mood.
Procedure
Because of the number of tests administered, counterbalancing was not
feasible. The AMT was therefore administered first to avoid the possibility
of the other tests influencing the memories recalled. All participants
completed the tests in the following order: AMT, verbal fluency, Block
Design, design fluency, Porteus Maze, Alternate Uses Test, and BDI.
Results and Discussion
The mean scores for the 24 participants on the different mea-
sures are reported in Table 2. To examine the hypothesis that AMS
would be associated with scores on the tests loading on executive
control, we performed a series of partial correlational analyses
with self-reported depression (on the BDI), which correlated sig-
nificantly with AMS, r(22)  .69, p  .001, partialed out.
AMS did not partially correlate significantly with any of the
measures of executive control that were corrected for errors (ver-
bal fluency, Alternate Uses Test, design fluency), prs(21)  |.26|,
ps  .22. The only significant correlations were with the Porteus
Maze Q score (a measure of errors), pr(21)  .50, p  .05, and
the WAIS–III Block Design score, which incorporates a measure
of errors, pr(21)  .42, p  .05.
On this basis, we decided a posteriori to examine the relation-
ship between AMS and the sum of the error scores across the
measures that did not already index errors (i.e., sum of errors on
the Alternate Uses Test, design fluency, and verbal fluency; see
Table 2). AMS was also significantly correlated with this com-
bined error score, with BDI scores partialed out, pr(21)  .51,
p  .02, indicating that having a greater number of errors across
the range of executive control tasks was associated with reduced
AMS.
To examine this relationship with errors further, we conducted
a multiple linear regression with AMS as the dependent variable.
BDI scores were entered on Step 1 and accounted for approxi-
mately 47% of the variance in AMS, F(1, 22)  19.80, p  .001.
Next, the number-correct scores on the different tasks (verbal
fluency, design fluency, and Alternate Uses Test) were entered on
Step 2 and uniquely, but nonsignificantly, accounted for 7% of the
AMS variance (F  1). Finally, the summed error score for these
measures along with the Porteus Maze Q score (a measure of
errors) were entered on Step 3 and uniquely and significantly
accounted for 19% of the AMS variance, F(2, 17) 5.95, p .05.
Overall, this pattern of data suggests that those processes that
drive AMS performance are to some extent related to the processes
that allow errors on a variety of measures of executive control. On
this point, it is important to acknowledge that the number of
specific memories retrieved on the AMT (i.e., level of AMS) is a
direct reflection of the number of “errors” on the AMT (as the sum
of number-correct scores and errors is a constant across partici-
pants). For instance, producing 17 specific memories to 24 word
cues on the AMT reflects the fact that to 7 of the cue words the
participant failed to generate a specific memory within the time
limit. However, the same relationship does not hold for several of
the executive control tasks in the present study (Alternate Uses
Test, Porteus Maze, verbal fluency, design fluency), in which the
numbers of correct responses and errors are not arithmetically
related in any straightforward way. In contrast, the score for
WAIS–III Block Design does reflect the number of errors as it
represents the number of designs (out of a fixed total) that the
participant was able to reproduce within certain constraints.
As AMS scores directly reflect the number of errors on the
AMT and correlate significantly only with those aspects of exec-
utive control tests that also directly reflect numbers of errors, one
way to conceptualize the present pattern of data is that AMS
scores, at least in part, are a proxy measure of some form of
tendency to generate errors, and/or a failure to prevent errors, on
executive-control-demanding tasks. This account may partly ex-
plain the current lack of clear findings in the AMT literature
concerning the relationship between AMS and executive function-
ing (see the introduction) in that it may be that many of the
relevant studies have ignored error scores. This focus would lead
to variability in the pattern of data as a function of the extent to
which the number-correct scores directly reflected the numbers of
errors for given participant groups and/or executive control tasks.
For instance, differences in the relationship between number-
correct scores and error scores across the samples could explain
why we found a clear relationship between verbal fluency number-
correct scores and AMS in Study 1 yet a much weaker relationship
in Study 2.
However, it is important to note that the present analyses re-
garding errors were post hoc and are therefore in need of replica-
Table 2
Demographic, Self-Reported Depression, Memory, and
Executive Control Task Data in Study 2
Variable M SD
Age (years) 40.83 9.18
Verbal fluency—correct 13.13 3.62
Verbal fluency—error 0.58 1.56
Block Design (scaled score) 12.17 3.91
Design fluency—correct 8.33 3.23
Design fluency—error 0.29 0.62
Alternate Uses Test—correct 4.92 1.59
Alternate Uses Test—error 0.29 0.69
Porteus Maze Test Q score 5.29 6.74
Beck Depression Inventory 13.83 9.89
No. specific memories on the AMT 16.79 5.32
Total errors 1.17 1.97
Note. n  24 (5 men, 19 women). AMT  Autobiographical Memory
Test; Total errors sum of errors in design fluency, verbal fluency, and on
the Alternate Uses Test.
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tion. In addition, the numbers of errors on the chosen tasks in the
present study were small, leading in most cases to problems with
using parametric analyses for the tasks individually (hence the use
of the combined error score). We therefore sought a conceptual
replication of these findings in Study 3, this time with the a priori
hypothesis that, independent of depression, reduced AMS would
be associated with errors on another cognitive task requiring
executive control, which nevertheless again had little to do with
autobiography and emotion.
Study 3: Performance on the AMT and a Number-
Generation Task
In Study 3 we sought to examine the relationship between AMS
and error performance on an executive control task which, as with
some of the earlier executive control tasks, made no explicit
demands on autobiographical memory. For this study we wanted
versions of the AMT and of another task that would both generate
significant proportions of errors in unselected participants to fa-
cilitate correlational analyses. We therefore devised an “extended
time” version of the AMT in which all of the cue words referred
to periods of time longer than 1 day (e.g., bereavement, holiday).
We reasoned that it would be more difficult to generate specific
memories of events lasting less than a day to such cues than on the
standard version of the AMT and therefore that the numbers of
nonspecific memories (i.e., errors) would be greater, leading to
lower AMS scores. For the comparison executive control task we
selected a number-generation paradigm that had been devised
previously (Scott, Barnard, & May, 2001a, 2001b), in which
participants generate numbers that satisfy a variety of different
task constraints (e.g., “ a sequence of six numbers within the range
two hundred and two up to five hundred and ninety-eight”).
Existing research on this number-generation task indicated that
participants often make mistakes that reflect a failure to satisfy one
of the task constraints while meeting the other constraints success-
fully (e.g., coming up with a sequence of six numbers that never-
theless falls outside the specified range; Scott et al., 2001a, 2001b).
This state of affairs seems analogous to the task parameters of the
AMT, in which correct responses (specific memories) must satisfy
a number of constraints (i.e., they must be autobiographical, a
memory, and of an event lasting less than 1 day). Our hypothesis
for Study 3 was therefore that AMS would be significantly nega-
tively correlated with numbers of errors on this number-generation
task, independent of self-reported depression.
Method
Participants
Twenty-four participants (7 men, 17 women) were recruited from the
CBU volunteer panel. The mean age was 35.26 years (SD  11.12 years,
range  19–51 years). Mean BDI score was 7.78 (SD  6.16).
Measures and Procedure
The AMT. The AMT was as for Studies 1 and 2. On this occasion 15
words were used (5 negative, 5 positive, and 5 neutral) with three practice
words (gigantic, grass, and absence). As noted above, we selected cue
words that referred to periods of time lasting longer than 1 day on the
assumption that it might be more difficult to retrieve specific memories
lasting less than 1 day to such cues (e.g., holiday, bereavement, adoles-
cence). The process of selecting these words is described in detail in the
Method section of Study 6.
Number-generation task. Fifteen questions were chosen from Scott et
al.’s (2001a, 2001b) studies. All of the questions required participants to
generate a number that had to satisfy two or more constraints (e.g., “Could
you please give me a seven-figure number between two million and ten
million?” “Could you please give me a sequence of any three numbers
within the range one hundred and one up to four hundred and ninety-
nine?”). The fifteen items with the highest mean error rates according to
Scott et al. (2001a, 2001b) were selected in order to preclude floor effects
on the task. The questions were presented verbally as per Scott et al.’s
(2001a, 2001b) study. Participants were given three simple number-
generation questions as practice. They were also told that the experimenter
would present each question once and would not repeat it. The errors on the
task were of three types: numbers not in sequence, an incorrect number of
digits, and numbers that fell outside the upper or lower bounds. These three
types of error were summed to provide an overall error score. The AMT
and the number-generation task (in counterbalanced order) were carried out
first, followed by the BDI.
Results and Discussion
One participant’s data had to be set aside because of problems
with the tape recorder during the AMT task. AMS (M  9.57,
SD  3.69) was significantly negatively correlated with number
task error scores (M  4.00, SD  3.68), pr(19)  .39, p  .05,
with both self-reported depression on the BDI and age partialed
out (both self-reported depression on the BDI and age showed a
significant correlation with AMS: BDI, r(21)  .38, p  .05;
age, r(21)  .40, p  .05). These results supported our hypoth-
esis that reduced AMS would be associated with more errors on
the number task.
Together with the data from Studies 1 and 2, the present results
provide support for the view that AMS scores reflect a tendency to
generate errors across a range of different executive control tasks.
What might be the candidate explanations for how this view of
AMS relates to the notion of executive control?
At least two possibilities merit serious consideration. The first is
that successful performance of the different executive control tasks
that have been examined requires effective inhibition of inappro-
priate candidate task responses and/or behavioral impulses. So, for
instance, on the number-generation task the process of searching
for numbers meeting all of the task requirements is likely to bring
to mind candidate responses that fall foul of one or more of those
requirements (e.g., a number that has the correct number of digits
but falls outside of the specified range). To carry out the task
correctly, the participant needs to inhibit these candidate responses
and continue searching for a number that meets all of the task
parameters. Errors on the task occur when such inhibition is
unsuccessful and the candidate responses consequently become
actual responses on the task. In line with this type of inhibition
account, it is notable that the types of errors that participants have
made on the tasks studied so far have almost always been task
related in the way that one would predict. So, for instance, errors
on the number-generation task did indeed consist of numbers that
met one or more (but not all) of the task parameters. Likewise,
errors in verbal fluency were usually not words beginning with the
wrong letter but rather repetitions of previously generated words,
proper nouns beginning with the correct letter, or words that share
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the same stem as previous responses (e.g., swim, swimming, swim-
mer), all of which violate the specific task instructions.
A similar explanation can be proposed for the AMT, in which,
we suggest, the memory search process is likely to generate
candidate responses in the form of overgeneral memories or se-
mantic associates that need to be inhibited in the search for an
appropriately specific response. A breakdown in such inhibition
would result in these candidates being proffered as actual re-
sponses, thus leading to reduced AMS on the task.
An alternative possibility is that errors on the various executive
control tasks under consideration reflect an inability to hold all of
the task parameters in mind for the duration of the task. Conse-
quently, inappropriate candidate task responses are filtered through
an incomplete representation of the task parameters and hence
form the basis of overt error responses.
Both of these possibilities are commensurate with the sort of
executive control account of cognitive processing in depression
that was outlined in the introduction (e.g., Hertel, 2000). In other
words, executive control deficits lead to either poor inhibition of
inappropriate target responses and/or poor “online” application of
the complete set of task instructions. Furthermore, this type of
account is not dissimilar to models of executive control in the
mainstream cognitive psychology literature: for example, the con-
trolled attention model of Engle and colleagues (e.g., Engle, 2002;
Engle & Kane, 2004; for a review, see Barrett et al., 2004). The
core feature of this particular approach is that individual differ-
ences in executive control, labeled in this framework working
memory capacity (WMC), reflect the availability of a domain-free
controlled attentional resource that is necessary to maintain tem-
porary goals (e.g., those pertaining to executive task performance)
in the face of distraction or interference (e.g., from inappropriate
candidate task responses). WMC is only one of several related
such notions in the cognitive psychology literature and maps onto
what Baddeley called the central executive (Baddeley, 1983,
1986), to what Norman and Shallice (1986) called the Supervisory
Attentional System, and to what Posner and Snyder (1975) and
Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) called controlled attention (see
Miyake & Shah, 1999). Similarly, the argument that task errors in
which one or more, but critically not all, task demands are met,
bears similarity to notions such as goal neglect in the work of
Duncan and colleagues (Duncan, Emslie, & Williams, 1996; Kane
& Engle, 2003).
Fluid intelligence, or the ability to solve novel problems, has
been shown to be strongly correlated with measures of constructs
such as WMC and degree of goal neglect in studies in the main-
stream cognitive psychology literature (A. R. A. Conway, Kane, &
Engle, 2003; Duncan et al., 1996; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, &
Conway, 1999; Unsworth & Engle, 2005). Fluid intelligence is
nonverbal and to a large extent culture free (Horn & Cattell, 1967).
If AMT performance is dependent on problems with executive
control as outlined above and as reflected in notions such as WMC
and goal neglect, then AMS scores should correlate with measures
of fluid intelligence, independent of depression. Given the equiv-
ocal nature of the existing research on AMS and measures of
nonfluid intelligence (e.g., Park et al., 2002) this seems an impor-
tant test of an executive control view of reduced AMS.
In Study 4 we therefore sought to investigate this predicted
relationship using Cattell’s Culture Fair Test of “g” (Cattell &
Cattell, 1960)—a standard measure of fluid intelligence. Our hy-
pothesis was that there would be a significant correlation between
reduced AMS and lower levels of g, independent of depression.
Study 4: Performance on the AMT and Cattell’s Culture
Fair Test of Fluid Intelligence (Spearman’s “g”)
Method
Participants
We carried out a small pilot study in which we obtained Cattell “g”
scores from the CBU volunteer panel records (on the basis of previous
completion of the test) for 10 panel participants who had completed the
AMT in an unrelated study. For this pilot sample, the correlation between
AMS and g scores was very high, r(8)  .72, p  .01. On this basis we
performed a power analysis to provide 80% power that a correlation of r
.60 would be greater than zero, with alpha set at .05. This indicated a
sample size of 16 or greater (Cohen, 1988). Consequently, 20 unselected
participants (13 women, 7 men) were recruited from the CBU volunteer
panel. The mean age of the participants was 40.65 years (SD  17.23
years, range  17–60 years). The mean BDI score was 5.45 (SD  4.85).
Measures and Procedure
The AMT. The AMT for this study was as for Studies 1–3. It consisted
this time of the 18 low-imageability cue words used by Williams, Healy,
and Ellis (1999). This is because low-imageability cues have been found to
lead to relatively fewer specific memories. Using those cues was therefore
likely to lead to a greater range of AMS scores, which would facilitate
correlational analyses.
Cattell’s Culture Fair Test of “g”—Scale 2 Form A (Cattell & Cattell,
1960). The Culture Fair Test of “g,” or fluid intelligence, contains 50
items, organized into four nonverbal tasks. It is designed to minimize the
influence of verbal comprehension, education level, and culture on various
aspects of the evaluation procedure, such as the administration instructions
and the item content. In the first subtest (series), individuals are presented
with an incomplete, progressive series of figures. The participants’ task is
to select, from among the choices provided, the answer that best continues
the series. In the second subtest (classification), participants are presented
with five figures and must select the one that is different from the other
four. In the third subtest (matrices), the task is to correctly complete the
matrix presented at the left of each row. Finally, in the fourth subtest
(conditions), participants select a figure that duplicates the topological
relationships of a target design. Participants completed the AMT first,
followed by Cattell’s Culture Fair Test of “g” and the BDI.
Results and Discussion
The hypothesis that AMS scores (M 11.75, SD 5.46) would
be significantly positively correlated with Cattell “g” scores (M 
34.60, SD  5.62), even after partialing out self-reported depres-
sion on the BDI—which this time did not correlate significantly
with AMS, r(18)  .14, ns—was supported, pr(17)  .60, p 
.01. This finding provides further support for the view that reduced
AMS indexes some form of executive control deficit, as such
deficits are closely indexed by fluid intelligence (Engle et al.,
1999; Kane & Engle, 2002).
Interim Summary of the First Four Studies
Our overarching aim behind the present series of studies was to
investigate the extent to which performance on the AMT, partic-
ularly in depressed individuals, is a function of reduced executive
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control associated with depressed mood (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988;
Hartlage et al., 1993; Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Hertel & Hardin,
1990). The first stage of this examination involved demonstrating
that the AMT is indeed an executive-control-demanding task,
independent of any relationship with depressed mood. Thus, in the
four studies up to this point we have shown a clear relationship
between performance on the AMT and on other nonautobiographi-
cal and generally emotion-unrelated tasks that depend on executive
control. In doing so we have exploited naturally occurring indi-
vidual differences in executive control to establish the existence of
such relationships independent of levels of depressed mood. Fur-
thermore, we have indicated that the clearest relationship across
tasks involved error scores, and we have speculated in the Results
and Discussion section of Study 3 about how deficits in executive
control may have led to such correlated patterns of errors across
tasks.
Finally, we have shown in Study 1 that a measure of executive
control (verbal fluency) significantly mediates the relationships
between both depressed mood and an eating disorder diagnosis (as
predictors) and AMS as the criterion, thus providing evidence that
variations in executive control can significantly account for the
relationship between mood or psychopathology and AMS. We do
not report mediational analyses from Studies 2–4, as these studies
were on unselected participants and so it is inappropriate to ana-
lyze the data in terms of hypotheses based on the effects of
significant depressed mood or other forms of psychopathology.
Having established that the AMT is a task susceptible to vari-
ations in executive control independent of depression and that
executive control mediates the relationships between depression or
psychopathology and AMS (Studies 1–4), the next challenge was
to gather experimental evidence that the diminished executive
control associated with depressed mood is an important factor in
determining the patterns of AMT performance in depression. To
this end, we sought to manipulate the task parameters of the AMT
in ways that would interact with individual differences in execu-
tive control in order to show that these manipulations can interact
in the same way with individual differences in levels of depressed
mood. In Studies 6–8 we examined three such manipulations
using stratified samples of participants selected so as to have a
broad range of self-reported depression severity. However, first we
wanted to demonstrate (in Study 5) that AMS on the standard
version of the AMT does indeed correlate with levels of depressed
mood in such a stratified sample, as this is obviously a prerequisite
of any studies that seek to manipulate the parameters of the
standard AMT to influence a putative relationship between AMS
and depressed mood within such samples.
Study 5: The Standard Version of the AMT and Its
Relationship to Depressed Mood
Although meta-analysis has indicated a large correlation (Co-
hen, 1988) between reduced AMS and elevated self-reported de-
pression scores in the existing literature, as outlined in the intro-
duction to this article (van Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 2004), many of
the relevant studies have involved clinical groups. Fewer studies
have examined this link outside of the clinical literature (e.g.,
Ramponi et al., 2004). As Studies 6–8 examined self-reported
depressed mood and AMS performance in nonclinical samples, it
seemed useful and important to first verify the existence of a
relationship between depressed mood and AMS in such nonclini-
cal groups. To this end, Study 5 simply involved administering the
AMT with a standard word set to a large nonclinical sample
stratified so as to include a wide range of self-reported depression
scores (on the BDI). Of course, the data from Studies 1–4 in the
present series are able to speak to this issue, as each involved a
measure of depressed mood and a version of the AMT. The
average correlation (using a z-transformation method) between
AMS and depressed mood from this initial tranche of studies was
r.43 (Corey, Dunlap, & Burke, 1998). However, although this
is encouraging, in these first four studies the samples were not
selected on the basis of depression scores, thus it was important to
benchmark the same effect in a sample stratified on depression
before examining AMT task manipulations in similarly stratified
samples (Studies 6–8).
Method
For the present study (and for Studies 6–8) we used a stratified approach
to recruit participants with a wide range of scores on the BDI to facilitate
correlational analyses involving depressed mood. To obtain this range of
depression scores we selected participants on the basis of their BDI scores
from previous studies in the CBU. We sourced representative numbers of
participants classified as “nondepressed” (BDI scores of 0–9), “mildly to
moderately depressed” (10–23), and “severely depressed” (24–63) on the
basis of these previous BDI scores (Shaw, Vallis, & McCabe, 1985). On
this basis, 60 participants (44 women, 16 men) were selected for the
present study, with a close to maximal range of BDI scores (0–58; the
maximum range is in fact 0–63), with n  25 in the nondepressed range
(mean age  39.92 years, SD  10.19 years; 19 women, 6 men), n  10
in the mild-to-moderate range (mean age 35.50 years, SD 12.29 years;
5 women, 5 men), and n 25 in the severe range (mean age 38.84 years,
SD  10.47 years; 20 women, 5 men). Mean overall age was 38.73 years
(SD  10.60 years, range  20–58 years).
The AMT methodology was as for Studies 1–4. This time 14 cue words
(7 positive and 7 negative) were selected from Brittlebank et al.’s (1993)
study. The positive and negative sets were balanced for emotionality and
frequency using the Kuc˘era and Francis (1967) norms. Two practice words
were used, exhausted and interested. The AMT was carried out first,
followed by the BDI.
Results and Discussion
In line with our hypothesis, self-reported depression on the BDI
(M  19.85, SD  17.33) showed a moderate negative correlation
with levels of AMS (M  6.15, SD  4.07), r(58)  .41, p 
.01. These data in a stratified sample, along with those from
published studies (e.g., Ramponi et al., 2004; van Vreeswijk & de
Wilde, 2004) and the data on unselected participants from Studies
2–4, suggest that elevated levels of depressed mood on the BDI in
analogue and subclinical samples are moderately negatively cor-
related (Cohen, 1988) with reduced AMS on the standard AMT.
This replicated AMS–depression effect thus provides a platform
from which we can manipulate the parameters of the standard
AMT (Studies 6–8) to examine putative effects on the AMS–
depression relationship.
Study 6: Short-Duration Versus Long-Duration Words on
the AMT
A clear prediction from the arguments outlined so far is that if
depression is associated with impoverished executive control (see
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Hertel, 2000), those participants with higher levels of depression
should find it harder to perform the AMT when the task parameters
are manipulated such that there is a greater requirement to offset or
inhibit the influence of distracting information (Barrett et al.,
2004). To examine this issue we therefore devised a version of the
AMT with two types of cue words. Half of the cue words were
chosen with the intention of priming distracting information in the
form of candidate AMT responses that do not fit the task demands.
The remaining half of the cue words were chosen with the inten-
tion of minimizing the priming of such distracting information. To
this end, the former half of the cue words related to periods of time
that were longer than 1 day (e.g., summer, cancer, adolescence;
see Study 3). The rationale was that such cue words would, in a
significant proportion of cases, automatically prime candidate au-
tobiographical memories that related to periods of time longer than
1 day. Therefore, to perform the AMT successfully (i.e., to gen-
erate memories that refer to events lasting less than 1 day), the
tendency to produce these candidate memories as task responses
would need to be inhibited and the retrieval search process con-
tinued. Our prediction was that for these long-duration words
higher levels of depressed mood should be associated with more
frequent failures to inhibit such response tendencies successfully,
thus leading to reduced AMS.
In contrast, the second set of cue words all referred to events that
routinely last less than 1 day (e.g., kiss, accident, evening). Our
rationale was that such cue words would automatically prime far
fewer inappropriate candidate memories (e.g., overgeneral mem-
ories). Instead, they should prime candidates that would be far
more likely already to meet the task demands of the AMT (i.e.,
specific memories). Our prediction here was that there would be
little or no correlation between AMS on this short-duration word
set and levels of depressed mood, as there should be a minimal
requirement to inhibit inappropriate task-generated response ten-
dencies. Critically, we hypothesized that an index of the difference
in AMS scores between the long-duration words and the short-
duration words would correlate with levels of depressed mood,
indicating that as mood increased this putative manipulation of
levels of to-be-inhibited response tendencies would have a greater
impact on AMS.
Our three hypotheses were therefore as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Levels of AMS will be higher to short-duration
words than to long-duration words.
Hypothesis 2: An index of the difference in AMS scores for
long- versus short-duration words will correlate with BDI
scores, with increasing BDI scores relating to a relative re-
duction in AMS to long-duration words compared with short-
duration words.
Hypothesis 3: BDI scores will show a negative correlation
with AMS for the long-duration words, but there will be little
or no correlation between AMS and BDI scores for the
short-duration words.
Method
Participants
Eighteen participants (10 women, 8 men) were recruited from the CBU
volunteer panel with a range of depression scores (0–28; n 11 in the mild
range, mean age  34.45, SD  10.61, 8 women, 3 men; n  5 in the
mild-to-moderate range, mean age 29.50, SD 10.88, 2 women, 3 men;
n 2 in the severe range, mean age 39.00, SD 9.90, 0 women, 2 men;
Shaw et al., 1985; see Study 5).5 The mean age of the participants was
33.82 years (SD  10.34 years, range  21–49 years).
Materials and Procedure
The AMT. The AMT was as for Studies 1–5 except that this time it
consisted of 30 words (5 positive, long duration, holiday, love, prosperity,
romance, summer; 5 negative, long duration, bereavement, cancer, depres-
sion, disease, slavery; 5 neutral, long duration, adolescence, century,
eternity, past, permanent; 5 positive, short duration, dance, kiss, laugh,
party wedding; 5 negative, short duration, accident, attack, cry, quarrel,
sneer; and 5 neutral, short duration, evening, moment, movie, occasion,
utterance). All words were selected from the Medical Research Council
Psycholinguistic Database—Version 2.00 (Wilson, 1987). Initially a list
was generated of those 4,852 words that had full data regarding concrete-
ness, part of speech, familiarity, imageability, Kuc˘era–Francis written
frequency (Kuc˘era & Francis, 1967), and number of letters. Tim Dalgleish
and Cecilia Au Yeung independently selected long-duration and short-
duration words from the list that represented, respectively, short (1 day or
less) versus long (more than 1 day) periods of time. After consultation, this
resulted in unanimous agreement on a list of 187 words.
This reduced list of 187 words was then given to four people to be rated
independently in terms of the valence (positive, negative, or neutral), time
duration (short, long, or not sure), and emotionality (a 7-point scale ranging
from 1 [no emotional association] to 7 [strong emotional associations]) of
each word. Examples and explanations of each rating were given. The final
sets of 15 long-duration and 15 short-duration words were selected such
that they were comparable on emotionality, frequency, imageability, and
number of letters (words were also matched on these dimensions across
valence categories). For the purpose of the present analyses we computed
an index of the difference between AMS performance on short-duration
versus long-duration words (AMS to short-duration words minus AMS to
long-duration words). The AMT was carried out first, followed by the BDI.
Results and Discussion
Participant characteristics and AMS data for the short-duration
and long-duration words as well as the index of the difference
between short-duration and long-duration word performance are
presented in Table 3. In line with the first hypothesis, participants
showed reduced AMS to long-duration words compared with
short-duration words, t(17)  8.17, p  .001, d  2.04. In line
with the second hypothesis, there was a significant correlation
between BDI scores and the index of the difference in AMS for
short-duration and long-duration words, r(16) .55, p .02, with
greater depression being associated with a greater tendency for
long-duration words, relative to short-duration words, to reduce
AMS. Finally, in line with the third hypothesis, BDI scores showed
a negative correlation with AMS to long-duration words, r(16) 
.50, p  .05 (thus further replicating the relationship between
depressed mood and reduced AMS) but almost no correlation with
AMS to short-duration words, r(16)  .06, p  .80.
These results indicate that manipulating the nature of the cue
words on the AMT with the aim of introducing putative variations
5 A power analysis based on the anticipated large correlations (Cohen,
1998) indicated a sample size of 20 or more, so the present study was
slightly underpowered. This was due to recruitment difficulties at the time
of the research.
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in levels of primed task-inappropriate candidate responses can
bring about variations in the strength of the relationship between
depressed mood and AMS. This suggests that reduced executive
control associated with depressed mood is important in driving the
relationship between depression and AMS. Study 7 involved a
different form of AMT task manipulation designed to influence the
relationship between depressed mood and AMS—the addition of
mental load.
Study 7: The Interaction of Depressed Mood and Mental
Load on the AMT
In many cases, individuals with low levels of executive control
are arguably more susceptible to manipulations of mental load in
dual-task experiments because they have poorer control capabili-
ties to begin with (Barrett et al., 2004). On the basis of the view
that depressed mood levels are to some extent associated with
variations in executive control, one would predict that higher
levels of depressed mood would be associated with greater sus-
ceptibility to such load manipulations. On this basis we asked
participants with varying levels of depressed mood to carry out
two versions of the AMT in a within-subjects design, with and
without the mental load of holding in memory a list of digits for
later recall. Our hypothesis was that an index of the difference in
AMS scores (cf. Study 6) between the load and no-load conditions
of the AMT would correlate with depressed mood on the BDI, with
higher BDI scores being associated with lower AMS under load,
relative to no load.
Method
Participants
Power analysis based on the correlation between depressed mood and
the index of AMS performance across long-duration and short-duration
words from Study 6 indicated a sample size of 20 or more to give 80%
power that a given correlation would differ from zero in a particular
direction with alpha set at .05. Twenty-three participants (14 women, 9
men) were therefore recruited from the CBU volunteer panel, again with a
range of scores on the BDI (0–31; n  11 in the mild range, mean age 
34.64, SD 15.19, 8 women, 3 men; n 9 in the mild-to-moderate range,
mean age  33.56, SD  13.78, 4 women, 5 men;, n  3 in the severe
range, mean age 33.00, SD 12.29, 2 women, 1 man; Shaw et al., 1985;
see Study 5). The mean overall age was 34.00 years (SD  13.72 years).
Materials and Measures
The AMT. The AMT was broadly the same as in the previous studies.
In this version, two matched sets of 16 words were chosen. To maximize
the range of AMS scores for the purposes of correlational analyses, we
drew these words from the list of long-duration words described in Study
6 and from the list of low-imageability words used in Williams, Healy, and
Ellis’s (1999) study, which indicated that reduced AMS was associated
with low imageability of the cue words in healthy volunteers. There were
8 positive and 8 negative words in each set. The two sets were comparable
on frequency, imageability, and emotionality. Word List A comprised the
following: bereavement, cancer, century, eternity, explanation, knowledge,
law, obedience, past, permission, romance, situation, slavery, soul, upkeep,
and winter. Word List B comprised the following: adolescence, boredom,
depression, disease, duty, effort, hearing, holiday, interest, legislation,
love, mood, opportunity, permanent, prosperity, and summer.
WAIS–III Digit Span. Each participant’s forward digit span was mea-
sured using the Digit Span subtest of the WAIS–III. This involves present-
ing participants with a series of number sequences of increasing length.
Participants’ digit span was indicated by the highest sequence repeated
correctly.
Procedure
Each participant performed the AMT twice, once under a condition of
mental load and once with no load. In the load condition participants were
presented with a sequence of digits prior to each cue word on the AMT.
The length of the string of digits was 2 less than the participants’ digit span.
Participants were instructed to remember the digits for recall after retrieval
of a memory to the subsequent AMT cue word. The digits were read aloud
to the participant before the cue word was presented and were recalled after
the participant had given a memory or after 2 min had passed, in the event
that no memory was generated. Approximately half of the participants (n
12) carried out the AMT under mental load with Word List A, and the rest
(n  11) carried out the AMT with Word List B. Order of presentation of
the two AMT conditions (load, no load) was also approximately counter-
balanced across participants (load then no load, n  11; no load then load,
n  12).
The WAIS–III Digit Span subtest was administered first, followed by the
two versions of the AMT. Participants then completed the BDI.
Results and Discussion
Mean raw digit span across participants was 7.52 (SD  1.04).
To examine our hypothesis that depressed mood (on the BDI)
would be associated with an increased tendency toward reduced
AMS under mental load (versus no load), we computed an AMS
index by subtracting AMS scores in the load condition (M 
13.35, SD 2.48) from those in the no-load condition (M 13.70,
SD  2.64). There was a significant correlation between BDI
scores (M  10.04, SD  8.14) and this AMS index (M  2.00,
SD  1.00), r(21)  .42, p  .05, in support of the hypothesis.
This provides further support (along with Study 6) that manip-
ulating the AMT parameters in ways that we know would interact
Table 3
Demographic, Self-Reported Depression, and Memory Data in Study 6
Variable M SD
Age (years) 33.82 10.34a
Beck Depression Inventory 8.78 7.46
No. specific memories on the AMT: short-duration words 12.56 2.33
No. specific memories on the AMT: long-duration words 7.44 2.68
No. specific memories on the AMT: short- minus long-duration words 5.11 2.65
Note. n  18 (8 men, 10 women).
a Data from 1 participant were not available.
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with individual differences in executive control can influence the
relationship between depressed mood and AMS. This again sug-
gests that diminished executive control associated with depressed
mood can to a significant extent drive the relationship between
depression and AMS.
We were concerned that, although the correlational aspects of
the data were as we predicted, examination of the scatter plot of the
AMS index and BDI scores revealed that a number of participants
with low scores on the BDI had a negative AMS index. This
indicates that AMS scores were higher under conditions of load,
compared with no load. This would account for why the mean
AMS scores for the load and no-load conditions were relatively
similar.
This finding suggests that the load applied by remembering
numbers may not have compromised executive control suffi-
ciently for those with greater executive control capabilities (i.e.,
those lower in depressed mood). It is possible that under con-
ditions of mental load, these participants were sufficiently able
to increase their level of controlled attention (Barrett et al.,
2004) during the AMT to compensate (or even overcompensate)
for the effects of the load. To investigate this hypothesis more
systematically, we performed a second mental load study using
the same methodology as in Study 7, this time exclusively with
participants with low BDI scores (N  16; BDI  10), who we
expected to have relatively unimpaired executive control. Rep-
licating the results for low-BDI participants in Study 7, these
new low-BDI participants were significantly less specific under
conditions of no load (M  11.50, SD  3.20) as compared with
conditions of load (M  12.81, SD  1.97), t(15)  2.31, p 
.05, one-tailed.
However, a further concern was that mental load might be
associated with relatively increased AMS in low-depression par-
ticipants, not because of the load per se, but because in the load
condition the AMT task was effectively interrupted by presenta-
tion of the to-be-recalled digits and by their later recall. In contrast,
in the no-load condition there was no such interruption of the
AMT. It may therefore have been the case that after each inter-
ruption in the load condition the low-BDI participants with their
relatively unimpaired executive control were able to refocus on
their mental representation of the AMT task instructions to remind
themselves of what they had to do—in particular, the need to keep
their responses specific. For these participants, this may then have
served to make responses on the load version of the AMT more
specific (higher AMS) than on the no-load version as a function of
this continued “revision” of the task instructions.
To examine this possibility we carried out a second supple-
mentary mental “load” study in which exclusively low-BDI
participants (N  20; BDIs  10), in a within-subjects design,
were either interrupted during the AMT and given a digit span
for immediate recall (i.e., there was no load) or not interrupted
and completed the AMT straight through. We used the same
AMT words as in the previous supplementary study. The data
provided no support for the view that interruption per se was
responsible for the load–no load differences in low-BDI partic-
ipants reported above, as there was no significant difference
between the interruption and no-interruption conditions,
t(19)  0.78, p  .45.
Study 8: The AMT With Reversed Instructions (AMT–R)
and Its Relationship to Depressed Mood
A key aspect of the argument developed throughout this arti-
cle—that levels of AMS on the AMT are to a significant extent a
function of executive control capabilities—is that AMT perfor-
mance requires sustained use of controlled attention to retrieve
specific memories, maintain task instructions, and deal with the
influence of automatically generated candidate memory response
tendencies that do not meet the AMT task requirements (i.e., they
are not specific). If such executive control is indeed a critical
explanatory variable with respect to AMT performance, then there
should be nothing particularly special about specific memories as
far as the executive control contribution to AMS is concerned.
Within an executive control analysis, specific memories simply
represent correct performance on the AMT as it is normally
constrained. Consequently, it should be possible to produce a
mirror image of the standard reduced AMS effect in depression by
asking participants to generate nonspecific (i.e., general) autobio-
graphical memories in a “reversed” version of the AMT (which we
shall call the AMT–R). In the AMT–R, the cue words should
automatically prime a proportion of specific candidate memory
response tendencies, which need to be inhibited so that the partic-
ipant can continue to search the autobiographical database for
suitably general candidates. An executive control analysis of the
AMT–R would therefore predict that depressed mood would be
correlated with greater AMS, as AMS would be an index of AMT
errors. It is important to note here that the prediction is not that
participants with higher levels of depressed mood will be more
specific on the AMT–R than they routinely are on the standard
AMT. Rather, the prediction is that on the AMT–R, those with
higher levels of depressed mood would be more specific than those
with lower levels of depressed mood.
One would perhaps not expect the absolute magnitude of this
relationship between AMS and depressed mood on the AMT–R to
be as strong as on the standard version of the task. The reason for
this is that autobiographical memory search is generally regarded
as hierarchical, with generic autobiographical descriptions such as
“lifetime periods” at the top of the hierarchy and specific memo-
ries at the bottom (e.g., M. A. Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).
In the AMT–R, to-be-inhibited candidate memories are likely to
include only those specific memories activated by some process of
direct retrieval that bypasses hierarchical search (M. A. Conway &
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). In contrast, in the standard version of the
AMT the pool of inappropriate candidate memories includes all
those activated as the retrieval process moves down the hierarchy.
This difference means that the standard version of the AMT is
likely to put greater demands on executive control processes (as
more response tendencies will require inhibition) than is the
AMT–R. Consequently, one would predict that the absolute values
of any correlations between AMS and depressed mood on the
AMT–R would be lower than those we found in the previous
studies using the standard AMT (with the benchmark being the
moderate correlation in Study 5).
As we have noted earlier, this analysis of the AMT in terms of
the influence of executive control is somewhat different from the
extant theoretical proposals in the literature on AMS. Here, spe-
cific memories often have something of a privileged status as they
carry detailed information about the emotional past that may be
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potentially distressing. As discussed in the introduction to this
article, the affect regulation hypothesis (Williams, 1996) therefore
proposes that reduced AMS on the standard AMT is not wholly a
function of the task parameters but represents a memory retrieval
style that has developed to avoid retrieving this detailed distressing
information. The proposal is that this avoidant style is associated
with greater levels of depressed mood and psychopathology, in
particular clinical depression and a history of trauma (e.g., Her-
mans et al., 2004). To the extent that reduced AMS is performing
an affect regulation function, one would predict that reversing the
AMT instructions would not reverse the direction of the relation-
ship between depressed mood and AMS as, regardless of the
instructions of the task, higher levels of depression should still be
associated with a greater need for affect regulation and thus with
lower levels of memory specificity.
We examined these issues in Study 8. For the AMT–R, partic-
ipants were asked to generate categorical memories to cue words,
that is, memories that conflated across more than one specific
occasion (so, to the cue word party, a categorical response might
be “I have been to three parties this year and enjoyed them all!”).
In this study, specific memories (e.g., “I really enjoyed John’s
birthday party last spring”) constituted task errors. Our main
prediction (Hypothesis 1) was that higher AMS scores on the
AMT–R would be related to increased depressed mood.
In this study we also included the Operation Span Task (OS-
PAN; Turner & Engle, 1989)—a widely used measure of con-
trolled attention. We therefore had two additional hypotheses.
First, we hypothesized that lower scores on the OSPAN would be
associated with greater AMS on the AMT–R, even with BDI
scores partialed out (Hypothesis 2). This therefore provides a
reversed version of those analyses presented in Studies 1–4, which
sought to show a positive relationship between better performance
on executive control tasks and level of AMS on the standard AMT,
with depression partialed out. Second, we hypothesized that higher
scores on the OSPAN would be associated with lower BDI scores
(Hypothesis 3). Because, to our knowledge, there are no published
studies investigating OSPAN performance in individuals with de-
pressed mood, we first performed a pilot study with groups of
dysphoric and nondysphoric participants to validate the task prior
to using it in the present AMT manipulation study. The details of
this pilot study are reported at the end of theMethod section below.
Method
Participants
Thirty-two participants (23 women, 9 men) were recruited from the CBU
volunteer panel, with a range of BDI scores (0–36; n  15 in the mild
range, mean age  42.13 years, SD  13.51 years, 10 women, 5 men; n 
11 in the mild-to-moderate range, mean age  41.18 years, SD  12.89
years, 9 women, 2 men; n 6 in the severe range, mean age 50.17 years,
SD  9.68 years, 4 women, 2 men; Shaw et al., 1985). We recruited a
higher sample size than in the previous studies of depressed mood (Studies
5–7) because of our concern that the absolute sizes of the critical correla-
tions pertaining to Hypotheses 1 and 2 may be smaller than in the earlier
studies (e.g., Study 5) for the reasons outlined in the introduction to the
present study. The mean age of participants was 43.3 years (SD  12.8
years).
Materials, Measures, and Procedure
AMT–R. In the AMT–R, participants had to avoid responding with
specific memories and instead had to generate categorical memories (i.e.,
memories that were summaries of more than one specific event; see the
description of the AMT in Study 1). The instructions for the AMT–R
consequently emphasized to participants that
The memory you recall should be of a certain category of event; in
other words, a series of similar events that happened to you at
different times. So, if I said the word “good,” it would not be okay to
say “I had a good time at Jane’s party,” because that does not refer to
a category of events. But it would be okay to say “I always enjoy the
parties at my friend Jane’s house” because that refers to a category of
events.
Twelve positive and 12 negative words were selected from Brittlebank
et al.’s (1993) study. At the end of the AMT–R, we asked participants to
recall the instructions, to ensure that they had understood the task and had
remembered the instruction to try to be categoric.
The OSPAN (Turner & Engle, 1989). In the OSPAN, participants are
shown a series of neutral words on cards, for 2 s each, and asked to
remember them. After the final word has been displayed, a simple numeric
equation (e.g., (9/3)  2  1) is shown to participants for 4 s. Participants
are then required to state whether the answer to the equation is correct or
incorrect and, subsequently, to recall the words. The OSPAN consists of 12
trials, 3 using two words, 3 using three words, 3 using four words, and 3
using five words, before each equation. Scores are the total number of
words recalled (out of 42). Participants who answered fewer than 85% of
the mathematical questions successfully have their data set aside. This is
the partial credit load scoring method as recommended by A. R. A.
Conway et al. (2005).
As noted, to our knowledge, there are no published reports of using the
OSPAN with individuals in a depressed mood. Therefore, to validate the
task for the present study we carried out a pilot study comparing OSPAN
performance across a dysphoric group (BDI scores  15; Shaw et al.,
1985; n  20, 6 men, 14 women, mean age  42.95 years, SD  12.53
years) and a nondysphoric group (BDI scores  10; Shaw et al., 1985; n
23, 7 men, 16 women, mean age  41.83 years, SD  11.64 years),
comparable on age, gender ratio, and education level (ps .4). The results
showed that the OSPAN scores for the participants in the dysphoric group
(M  26.85, SD  6.71) were significantly lower than for the nondyspho-
ric control participants (M 31.83, SD 7.80), t(41) 2.23, p .04, d
0.71, suggesting that OSPAN performance can vary as a function of
dysphoric mood across education-comparable samples, thus providing
sufficient validation for the use of the measure in the present study. The
AMT–R was administered first, followed by the OSPAN, and finally the
BDI.
Results and Discussion
All participants were able to correctly recall the AMT–R in-
structions at the end of the task. Unsurprisingly, AMS scores on
the AMT–R were low and were not normally distributed (M 
2.94, SD  3.73), and indeed participants generated far more
categoric memories (M  18.53, SD  4.20) than specific mem-
ories on the AMT–R. A fourth root transformation (Howell, 1997)
allowed the AMS data to conform to the requirements for para-
metric statistics. However, where appropriate, relevant analyses
were also performed using nonparametric tests as a cross-check for
the results of the parametric analyses using the transformed data.
In line with our first hypothesis, BDI scores (M  13.56, SD 
10.90) were correlated positively with AMS (fourth root trans-
formed), r(30)  .35, p  .05. This relationship was also signif-
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icant using nonparametric testing with the untransformed data,
rs(30)  .35, p  .05. In line with our second hypothesis, perfor-
mance on the OSPAN (M  33.91, SD  5.73; with no partici-
pants’ data set aside) correlated negatively with AMS (fourth root
transformed) even after controlling for BDI scores, pr(29).49,
p  .005. Finally, in line with our third hypothesis, scores on the
OSPAN were negatively associated with BDI scores, r(30) 
.41, p  .02.
Taken together these results indicate that the direction of the
association between levels of depressed mood and AMS can be
reversed by asking participants to generate general (categoric)
rather than specific memories on the AMT–R, such that higher
levels of depression were associated with greater AMS. These data
are again consistent with the predictions of our conceptualization
of the AMT as a task significantly dependent on executive control,
as outlined in the introduction to this study. This was further
confirmed by the fact that performance on the OSPAN was neg-
atively correlated with levels of AMS. The data from Study 8 also
replicated the finding from our pilot study (see the Method section
of this study) that higher scores on the BDI are associated with
lower scores on the OSPAN, this time using a correlational design.
General Discussion
The Research Rationale and Summary of the
Main Findings
There are a host of research studies indicating that AMS is
relatively reduced in individuals with depressed mood, clinical
depression, and a variety of other clinical and subclinical states
(see Williams et al., in press, for a review). The rationale for the
present series of eight studies was to examine systematically, for
the first time, the contribution of executive control processes to
this widespread finding. In particular, we wanted to examine
whether differences in executive control could significantly ac-
count for the relationship between depressed mood and reduced
AMS.
To this end the eight studies generated five key sets of findings:
1. Increased depressed mood was significantly related to re-
duced AMS in six studies (Studies 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7), replicating
the established finding in the literature (e.g., Ramponi et al., 2004).
2. Increased depressed mood was also found to be associated
with decreased executive control in stratified depressed samples
using a standard executive control measure—the OSPAN—using
both a group and a correlational design (Study 8).
3. Reduced AMS was associated with poorer performance on
tasks that are associated with executive control, including mea-
sures of verbal fluency (Study 1), of block design (Study 2), and of
fluid intelligence (Study 4), all independent of depressed mood.
Reduced AMS also related to numbers of errors on verbal fluency,
design fluency, and the Alternate Uses Test (all three summed;
Study 2), on the Porteus Maze Task (Study 2), and on a number-
generation task (Study 3), independent of depressed mood. A
reversed version of the AMT (the AMT–R) revealed that AMS
was associated in the expected way with operation span (on the
OSPAN; see Study 8), again independent of depressed mood.
These different relationships were demonstrated variously in un-
selected healthy participants, in participants with subclinical de-
pressed mood, and in a clinical group of participants with eating
disorders.
4. Executive control (in the form of verbal fluency) was found
to mediate the relationship between both depressed mood and a
diagnosis of eating disorder, as predictors, and AMS, as the crite-
rion (Study 1).
5. The magnitude and direction of the relationship between
depressed mood and AMS was altered by experimentally manip-
ulating the task parameters of the AMT so as to either increase or
decrease the demands on executive control. Manipulating the
content of the AMT cue words (Study 6), the addition of mental
load (Study 7), and reversal of the AMT instructions (Study 8), in
participant samples with a range of depressed mood scores, all
served to change the relationship between depressed mood and
AMS in ways that one would predict if this relationship was driven
to a significant extent by a reduction in executive control capabil-
ities associated with depressed mood.
Taken together these five sets of findings provide support for the
view that the oft-replicated relationship between reduced AMS and
various clinical and subclinical states (see Williams et al., in press,
for a review) can be significantly accounted for by reduced exec-
utive control in those states. This is potentially important for a
number of reasons. First, it provides a new and different way of
thinking about AMS effects, which are at present incompletely
understood. Second, because executive control provides a potential
account of AMS effects that is not centered on autobiographical
memory processes (unlike, for instance, the affect regulation hy-
pothesis outlined in the introduction), it permits a closer integra-
tion of the AMT literature with the literature on other aspects of
cognitive processing in depression (as well as in other clinical and
subclinical states; e.g., Brewin & Beaton, 2004). This facilitates
the development of broad, integrated cognitive theories of depres-
sion, as opposed to specific, bespoke theories that focus on discrete
cognitive phenomena. Finally, an executive control analysis of
AMS effects establishes a bridge between important aspects of the
mainstream cognitive psychology literature and phenomena in
abnormal psychology. Such bridges are clearly going to be impor-
tant in efforts to develop macrotheoretical models of cognition–
emotion relations (see Dalgleish, 2004, for a discussion).
In the remainder of this section we seek to do three things. First,
we discuss the nature of any executive control deficits in depres-
sion and how they relate to reduced AMS. Second, we revisit the
key findings in the AMS literature and explore how they might be
explained in times of reduced executive control. Finally, we con-
sider limitations and future directions for this research endeavor.
The Nature of the Executive Control Explanation for AMS
Throughout the article we have conceptualized individual dif-
ferences in executive control as differences in the ability to exert
controlled attention in the pursuit of (task) goals, particularly in the
face of automatically generated distracter material (Barrett et al.,
2004; Rosen & Engle, 1997; see the Results and Discussion
section of Study 2). However, this broad definition is likely to
encompass a number of different aspects of cognitive functioning
(Engle et al., 1999; Hertel, 2000), some or all of which may be
critical in understanding AMS effects. Although the present data
clearly indicate for the first time a role for executive control in
accounting for AMS effects, they cannot provide definitive insight
into exactly which of these different facets of executive control are
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most important. In this vein, a number of candidates present
themselves.
First, AMS may be a function of difficulties with inhibition of
distracters (Engle, Conway, Tuholski, & Shisler, 1995). As dis-
cussed in Footnote 1, there is a healthy debate within cognitive
psychology about the extent to which differential processing of
certain information at the expense of distracting information is
either a function of direct (i.e., strong) inhibition of the latter or is
simply a function of the former receiving preferential processing
(i.e., weak inhibition; see, e.g., Anderson & Spellman, 1995;
Dalgleish et al., 1999; MacLeod et al., 2003). This debate notwith-
standing, it is plausible that depressed mood is associated with
deficits in either strong or weak inhibition with respect to distract-
ing information in the context of tasks requiring the application of
controlled attention, and there are data consistent with deficits in
inhibition associated with depression on such tasks (e.g., Power,
Dalgleish, & Claudio, 2000; see Mathews & MacLeod, 2005, for
some discussion).
Second, the AMS effects reported here may reflect a difficulty
in maintaining the entire set of task goals in active memory in the
face of distracting information (Engle et al., 1999). For example,
on the AMT the principal goal of retrieving autobiographical
material may remain in focus, but the subgoal that the material has
to be specific in nature may be neglected. This does not mean to
imply either that participants are unaware of the goals or that they
would have forgotten them; rather, the argument is that executive
control is not applied in a way that serves to hold in memory all of
the goals and furthermore to check all candidate responses against
each goal for every trial to prevent errors. This aspect of executive
control has perhaps best been elucidated in the literature on goal
neglect (Duncan et al., 1996; see Engle et al., 1999, for a
discussion).
A third possibility is that those individuals with seemingly
impaired executive control utilize a different balance of automatic
and controlled processing (e.g., Barrett et al., 2004). This may not
reflect a lack of motivation or initiative to perform complex tasks
like the AMT. Instead, it may reflect previous learning that at-
tempts at controlled processing are unsuccessful and therefore not
worth the investment of limited attentional resources. In effect,
individuals who appear impaired in executive control may adopt
an automatic processing mode as a way to optimize their perfor-
mance on cognitively demanding tasks. There is some indication
that individuals characterized by different levels of executive con-
trol differ in their use of automatic and controlled processing
strategies during executive-control-demanding tasks. For example,
in Rosen and Engle’s (1997) study described above, individuals
lower in executive control (or working memory capacity, in their
terms) relied on automatic spreading activation for retrieval of
category exemplars in a fluency task, whereas those higher in
working memory capacity used controlled attention to guide their
search after a certain point in time. As a result, those lower in
executive control in this study might be best described by the
cognitive miser metaphor (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Cognitive mi-
sers are seen as having severely limited executive control capabil-
ities and as a result adopt strategies that simplify the need for
controlled attention. Although they may have an array of goals or
motives, they do not have the executive control capability to
maintain goal-relevant processing in the face of complex situa-
tions, such that they end up emphasizing efficiency over any other
processing goal.
Related to these questions about the exact nature of any cogni-
tive control deficits in depression is the issue of why depressed
mood should lead to problems with executive control in the first
place. Perhaps the strongest candidate explanation is that the
ruminative processes and task-irrelevant thoughts that are associ-
ated with depression interfere with the efficient and effective use
of controlled attention in the performance of tasks such as the
AMT in the ways outlined above. Of note here are Watkins and
Teasdale’s (2001) data showing that experimental manipulations
to increase rumination serve to reduce AMS in depressed partici-
pants. It would be interesting to examine whether these sorts of
effects were mediated by shifts in executive control capability.
An Executive Control Account of the Key Findings From
the AMS Literature
It is as yet unclear to what extent individual differences in
executive control can explain all of the data on AMS effects in the
literature (see the introduction to this article), as the relevant
studies have yet to be carried out. However, given that executive
control appears to be a significant factor in reduced AMS, one
should be able to generate a plausible account of the key findings
in this literature in terms of such control. In this section therefore
we examine the potential explanatory breadth of individual differ-
ences in executive control, beginning with the relationship be-
tween AMS and trauma.
An executive control analysis of the widely replicated associa-
tions between reduced AMS and both trauma history and symp-
toms of posttraumatic stress (e.g., Hermans et al., 2004; Kuyken &
Brewin, 1995) would propose that the experience of trauma and
symptoms reflecting attempts to process that trauma, including
intrusive cognitions and affect (see Dalgleish, 2004), compromise
executive control. Consistent with this, there is a body of research
showing that traumatized individuals with significant posttrau-
matic stress are impaired on a range of executive control tasks (see
Knight & Taft, 2004, for a review). Similarly, in a series of
experiments Ellis, Moore, Varner, Ottaway, and Becker (1997)
showed that the presence of irrelevant thoughts predicts poorer
executive control task performance in individuals experiencing
affective states.
A similar analysis can be offered for other aspects of the
reduced-AMS literature: in particular, why reduced AMS (a) in-
dexes a relatively poor prognosis for clinical outcome in longitu-
dinal studies in different clinical groups (e.g., Brittlebank et al.,
1993), (b) is associated with impoverished social problem solving
(e.g., Goddard et al., 1996; Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 1997),
and (c) relates to participants’ difficulty being specific and fluent
about the future (Williams et al., 1996; see also Study 1 of the
present article). The thesis here would be that reduced executive
control to a significant extent drives both poor problem solving
(e.g., Kyllonen & Christal, 1990, reported correlations of .8–.9
between executive control and reasoning ability in a series of
studies with over 2,000 participants) and low specificity about the
future (see Study 1), as well as reduced AMS. It is interesting to
note that when AMS is experimentally manipulated, it signifi-
cantly affects future event specificity (Williams et al., 1996) and
problem-solving ability (Williams et al., 2006, Studies 4 and 5),
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thus suggesting that level of AMS may itself have a causal link
with these variables. What is unclear at present is the extent to
which this causal relationship may be mediated by executive
control. Finally, relative difficulties with problem solving, being
specific about the future, and dealing with intrusive cognitions and
affect (as discussed above) are likely to ensure that individuals
with lower executive control will recover less well from clinical
states in longitudinal studies.
The relationship between low executive control and reduced
AMS in individuals recovered from depression (e.g., Mackinger,
Pachinger, et al., 2000) could reflect two underlying cognitive
processes. First, individuals with lower levels of executive control
may be more vulnerable to depression in the first place (i.e.,
executive control is a risk factor for the onset of depression), for
the same reasons that lower executive control is associated with
poor recovery from depression. There is some research consistent
with this; for example, Klein and Boals (2001) showed that indi-
viduals low in executive control (working memory capacity) re-
acted with greater affect to stressful life events relative to individ-
uals high in executive control.
Second, there is a wealth of evidence that individuals recovered
from depression chronically need to apply executive control to
suppress, block, or gate negative self-related information (see
Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000, for a review). So, for example, Wen-
zlaff and Bates (1998) showed that individuals vulnerable to
depression exhibited certain depressogenic self-referent cognitive
biases but only when placed under conditions of mental load.
Under conditions of no load they were indistinguishable from
never-depressed control participants. It may therefore be the case
that executive control capabilities are chronically compromised in
depression-vulnerable individuals in the service of dealing with
negative self-referent material. There would therefore be fewer
such “resources” available for executive-control-demanding tasks
such as the AMT.
It is interesting to note that on the basis of these arguments one
would also argue that impoverished executive control would be a
risk factor for the onset of traumatic stress disorders following
trauma exposure due to associated difficulties in dealing with
automatically generated distracting information such as intrusive
thoughts, images, and nightmares about the trauma. In line with
this possibility we know that lower scores on standard intelligence
tests are a risk factor for the development of posttraumatic stress
states in trauma-exposed samples (see Brewin, Andrews, & Val-
entine, 2000; Ozer, Best, Lipsey, & Weiss, 2003), and this may
reflect the fact that individuals relatively low in executive control
(who would tend to score lower on general IQ measures) are at
greater risk. A related issue has been examined experimentally by
Brewin and Beaton (2004). They showed that higher numbers of
unwanted intrusive thoughts on the White Bear Suppression Task
(Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) were associated with diminished ex-
ecutive control on the OSPAN in healthy participants.
Other Factors Involved in AMS
The causal link between executive control and AMT perfor-
mance that we have demonstrated here does not of course rule out
the possibility that other psychological processes might also influ-
ence AMS (see Williams et al., in press). For example, we have
argued elsewhere that a key factor in understanding reduced AMS
in various clinical groups may be the fact that the AMT cue words
map onto particular pathological generic sets of concerns or beliefs
(schemas) of the participants (Dalgleish et al., 2003), which may
themselves be chronically primed and reinforced by ruminative
processes (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). The proposal is that in such
instances a given cue word is likely to activate or bring to mind a
candidate generic response reflecting these negative schemas. As
only specific memories count as correct responses on the standard
AMT, these generic candidates need to be inhibited as responses in
the service of successful task performance. This analysis suggests
that individuals suffering from clinical conditions characterized by
such underlying negative schematic representations will have a
relatively greater number of generic candidate responses to inhibit
compared with healthy control participants. It is easy to see how
this relative abundance of to-be-inhibited generic responses could
interact with impoverished executive control in clinical partici-
pants to bring about a markedly reduced AMS effect in such
groups.
Another potential explanatory variable for reduced AMS effects
is of course the affect regulation hypothesis outlined in the intro-
duction. The present findings considered together (especially those
from Study 8) do not support an affect regulation view of the
relationship between depressed mood and AMS. However, it may
be the case that a different pattern of results would emerge in a
significantly traumatized sample. Indeed, findings from Study 1, in
which we did not find a relationship between verbal fluency and
self-reported parental abuse to mirror the established relationship
between AMS and this variable (Dalgleish et al., 2003), suggest
that a history of trauma and/or posttraumatic symptomatology may
exert effects on AMS somewhat independently of any effects of
executive control, though this remains an empirical question.
Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Directions
The present series of studies has shown clearly for the first time
that individual differences in executive control play a key role in
driving performance on the AMT, indicating that these differences
are an important element in accounting for the widely reported
relationship between subclinical and clinical states and reduced
AMS on this task (Williams et al., in press). One limitation of the
present studies is that they focused predominantly on reduced
AMS in subclinical samples (though see Study 1). Further eluci-
dation of executive control effects on AMS in different clinical
groups therefore awaits additional empirical work. Second, we
have concentrated on the relationships between AMS and de-
pressed mood, and with the exception of Study 1, we have ne-
glected the relationship between AMS and various indices of
trauma.
In line with these comments, future research directions should
include examining the executive control hypothesis of AMT per-
formance in a wider range of clinical and clinically vulnerable
groups, in longitudinal studies, and in populations with experience
of trauma. Further work is also needed to investigate exactly which
aspects of subclinical and clinical states lead to impairments in
executive control and how these aspects can be addressed through
clinical intervention. Another key focus for future research is to
elucidate exactly which aspects of executive control are implicated
in the reduced AMS effect and, more generally, which aspects of
executive control are compromised in depressed mood and other
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subclinical and clinical states. Related to this, the door is now open
to examine in theoretically motivated ways the relationship be-
tween reduced AMS and other aspects of cognitive task perfor-
mance in depression and other clinical and subclinical states (e.g.,
Brewin & Beaton, 2004).
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